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Abstract
The mobile penetration rate in Taiwan has climbed from 6.86 to 112.15. Mobile phone accounts per 100 capita in the
first 6 years of market competition, during this time the state-owned incumbent Chunghua Telecom has been dethroned by
a new entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp. This paper addresses the cause of Taiwan’s unprecedented mobile growth, and
provides policy solutions for countries that strive to improve their telecommunications sectors in a short time scale. The
authors highlight the fundamental role of asymmetric regulation, rather than pure liberalization, in the creation of the
deregulated telecommunications industry in Taiwan. The asymmetric regulation in Taiwan is manifested in a twofold
framework: the dominant carrier vs. competitors, and the fixed-line carrier vs. mobile companies. Econometric analysis
concludes that dualistic asymmetric regulation leads to higher growth for mobile competitors and raises the total mobile
penetration rate. However, the authors warn against the paradoxical consequences of dualistic asymmetric regulation. The
regulatory benefits which mobile entrants received evolved into rents when they successfully lobbied to end the follow-me
call service, the pricing scheme of which contradicts the asymmetric revenue-sharing constraint. The paper calls for a
sunset clause for dualistic asymmetric regulation in order to take full advantage of its strengths, while at the same time
preventing rent seeking by the firms, which benefit.
r 2006 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Keywords: Regulatory asymmetry; Revenue-sharing constraint; Contractarian approach; Regulatory costs; Rent seeking
1. Introduction: on the wave of the wireless society
Driven by the policy goal of building Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific Telecommunications Hub and obtaining
WTO membership, the Taiwan government has passed three telecommunications reform acts since the early
1990s in order to restructure the market. These acts established a liberalization framework by introducing
private competition, the separation of the public telecommunications operator from the regulatory regime,
and the categorization of telecommunications services. In early 1997, eight mobile licenses were awarded to six
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out of 22 enterprises via a beauty contest. In each region, four new entrants competed with the state-owned
incumbent—Chunghua Telecom—for a share of its market.1
Within only 6 years of opening the market, mobile subscription in Taiwan has escalated from 6.86 to 112.15
phone accounts per 100 head (as of September 2003). An additional 20 million users signed up for the service,
and the number of mobile subscribers has grown 16.02 times. The unmet demand for mobile telephony before
1998—a waiting list of over one million—has vanished entirely. Meanwhile, Chunghua Telecom’s market
share plummeted to about 30 percent. The leader status of Chunghua Telecom has been eroded by a private
entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp, which now holds a significant lead of 6 000 000 users.2 Table 1 summarizes the
development of mobile communications in Taiwan.
With such rapid growth in the mobile penetration rate in 5 years, Taiwan has pushed its rank from far
below average to a position of global paramountcy in mobile, outperforming all OECD member countries. It
has been said that the liberalization policy implemented by the Ministry of Transportation and
Communication (MOTC) and Directorate General of Telecommunications (DGT) constitutes a breathtaking
development (Chou, 2000). An examination of liberalization precedents worldwide finds that Taiwan’s
experience is exceptional. Among the countries that have undergone telecommunications reforms, none of
them has ever achieved so high a mobile penetration rate or reversed the dominant status of the incumbent in
such a short time.
This paper is written to address the ‘‘real’’ cause behind the unprecedented mobile development in Taiwan,
and to discuss feasible solutions for other countries planning to improve their telecommunications in a short
time. The asymmetric features inherent in Taiwan’s communications regulations are highlighted for the first
time, and based upon a perspective of contractarianism and institutional economics, it is contended that this
dualistic asymmetric regulation governing Taiwan’s telecommunications is in fact the key institutional
component which fostered its growth in mobile telephony. The telecommunications regulators place restraints,
including price caps and interconnection mandates, on the dominant carrier alone, and yet give mobile
communications providers the authority to set their tariffs and interconnection charges. This asymmetry in
regulations allows fixed-line end users to be easily lured to switch to mobile services as mobile companies set
high tariffs for fixed-line-to-mobile communications. Subsequently, mobile communications traffic has surged,
with revenues surpassing those of fixed-line telephony (DGT, 2003).
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Table 1
Mobile communications in Taiwan
Mobile subscribers Penetration rate
(subscribers/per
hundred persons)
Market share of
entrants (%)
Market share of the
incumbent (%)
September 2003 25,290,000 112.15 69.06 30.94
December 2002 23,905,000 106.44 71.87 28.13
December 2001 21,632,980 96.58 73.80 26.20
December 2000 17,874,000 80.26 73.90 26.10
December 1999 11,541,139 52.24 69.85 30.15
June 1999 7,477,000 34.29 63.60 36.40
December 1998 4,727,045 21.56 53.89 46.11
March 1998 2,442,980 11.21 30.00 70.00
December 1997 1,492,000 6.86 0.00 100.00
Source: DGT /http://www.dgt.gov.tw/Chinese/Data-statistics/11.3/graph3.shtmlS.
1Among the eight, two nationwide licenses went to Taiwan Cellular Corp and FarEastTone, and six regional licenses went to KG
Telecom, Tuntex, TransAsia, MobiTai, Taiwan Cellular Corp, and FarEastTone. The licenses are ratified with the standard of the Global
System for Mobile communications (GSM). Nationwide operators use the 1900 GSM standard, while regional operators deploy the 900
GSM standard.
2Taiwan Cellular Corp. now has 8.78 million subscribers, a 29.8 percent market share.
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The dualistic asymmetric regulation in Taiwan is thus a potential model for policymakers in other countries
wishing to expand telecommunications. The question, which remains, is, should countries embrace this
approach without reservation? In response, this paper investigates the paradoxical consequences, which the
dualistic asymmetric regulation fosters, and finds that asymmetric regulation could entail rents for mobile
competitors, even though it successfully grows mobile services. The rival competitors thus have an incentive to
secure these rents through uneconomic activities such as political lobbies or entangling lawsuits.
2. Dualistic asymmetric regulation and its policy impact
Fig. 1 portrays the twofold framework of the asymmetric regulation: dominant/non-dominant carrier3 and
fixed-line/mobile service provider. The letters A, B, C, and D individually represent different types of
telecommunications service providers (TSPs). Fig. 1 also shows six types of communications transmission and
termination between A, B, C, and D. In 1997, the DGT declared Chunghua Telecom, the only fixed-line
carrier thus far, to be the dominant carrier and other mobile service providers to be non-dominant carriers.
Accordingly, the dualistic framework of asymmetric regulation is manifested in Line 2 as Chunghua Telecom
versus non-dominant mobile firms. Compared with its counterparts, Chunghua Telecom is subject to excessive
regulatory oversight from the DGT. The asymmetric constraints on the dominant carrier and on the fixed-line
service provider are respectively analyzed as follows.
2.1. Asymmetric constraints on the dominant carrier
Article 26.1 of the Telecommunications Act (1999) prohibits the dominant carrier from refusing
interconnection and abusing its market power. The dominant carrier is obligated to disclose certain cost
information, sell bottleneck services, and provide unbundled access to its network (Liu, 2001).4,5 Article 9 of
the ‘‘Administrative Regulation Governing Tariffs of Type I Telecommunications Enterprises’’ obliges the
dominant carrier to set its tariffs based on the price caps approved by the DGT.
As is well known, unbundled access may deprive the incumbent of economies of scope and scale while
providing cost savings to its rivals. Total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) pricing, which charges
unbundled elements at long-run marginal costs, does not compensate for the incumbent’s opportunity costs of
providing such access (Brock & Katz, 1997). Sidak and Spulber also argue that unbundled access infringes
upon the incumbent’s property rights as protected by the Constitution (1998, p. 34). In addition, asymmetric
disclosure of cost information empowers rivals in competing against the dominant carrier, as they can behave
strategically by setting prices slightly below the incumbent’s (Besen & Farrell, 1994). The author’ previous study
demonstrates that the mandate of symmetric information disclosure otherwise deflates the market values of
competitive rivals as they are unable to engage in strategic behaviors (Chou, 1999, pp. 304–5). As far as price
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3The term ‘‘dominant carrier’’ is defined by Article 5 of ‘‘Administrative Regulation Governing Tariffs of Type I Telecommunications
Enterprises’’ as a TSP that meets any of the following criteria:
(A) having control over essential facilities, or
(B) having dominant market power over prices, or
(C) having subscribers or turnover that account for at least 25 percent in the relevant market.
4Article 26.1 states that a designated dominant carrier is prohibited from:
(A) refusing, directly or indirectly, interconnection requested by other facility-based TSPs by reason of proprietary technology;
(B) refusing to disclose information to other facility-based TSPs regarding the measurements of interconnection charges and relevant
costs thereof;
(C) improperly determining, maintaining, or altering the prices charged for telecommunications services;
(D) refusing, without due cause, access to network elements requested by other facility-based TSPs;
(E) rejecting, without due cause, the lease requests of transmission circuits made by TSPs or subscribers;
(F) rejecting, without due cause, testing requests made by TSPs or subscribers and,
(G) abusing market power or engaging in unfair competition.
5This provision corresponds to Article 10 of the Fair Trade Law that prohibits anti-competitive conduct by the dominant carrier.
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caps are concerned, they function closer to the requirement of information disclosure in a competitive market.
Such regulation enables rival competitors to obtain information regarding the incumbent’s tariff schemes at
reduced costs and to strategically price their services. Admittedly, market entrants prefer asymmetric
constraints on the dominant carrier so that they can realize a competitive advantage in capturing market share.
2.2. Asymmetric restrictions on the fixed-line service provider
The determining feature of dualistic asymmetric regulation lies in the restriction on the fixed-line operator.
This regulation distinguishes Taiwan from all other regulatory governances worldwide. In the DGT’s view, the
fixed-line network is the basic infrastructure over which long-distance, international, and mobile services are
originated, transmitted, or terminated. Like long-distance and international services, mobile communications
are treated as the downstream service of local telephony. As the ‘‘access charge’’ model is used for revenue
allocation between upstream and downstream services, the DGT applied the same rule to mobile
communications generated from Chunghua Telecom’s fixed-line network.
Article 19 of ‘‘The Administrative Rules for Network Interconnection Between Type I Telecommunications
Carriers’’ stipulates that:
Except for international communications, ownership of tariffs for communications between mobile
communications networks and fixed-line communications networks shall be governed by the following principles:
1. Tariffs shall be collected by the call-originating telecommunications carrier from its subscribers pursuant to
the tariff schedules set by mobile communications network carriers, and the revenue from tariffs shall go to
the mobile communications network carriers; and
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Dominant carrier Non-dominant carrier
Fixed-line operators
A 
2
1
4 B
5
6
Mobile service provider
3
C D
A: the fixed-line operator with the dominant status;
B: the non-dominant fixed-line operator;
C: the mobile company with the dominant status; and
D: the non-dominant mobile firm.
Line 1: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between A and C;
Line 2: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between A and D;
Line 3: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between C and D;
Line 4: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between A and B;
Line 5: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between B and C; and
Line 6: communication originated, transmitted, or terminated between B and D;
Fig. 1. Dualistic Asymmetric Regulation in Taiwan. Notice: Three new fixed-line licenses were awarded on March 19, 2000 and these firms
started local service in/as early as ? April 2001. Therefore, only three combinations are available as of the day of analysis (i.e., Line 1, Line
2 and Line 3).
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2. Bad debts shall be assumed by the call-originating telecommunications carrier and such carrier shall not be
relieved of its responsibility to pay relevant charges to the call-terminating telecommunications carriers.
While the calling party pays all the communications charges, Article 19 delegates to mobile firms the pricing
authority over all outgoing and incoming mobile services, and allocates such revenues to them. Under this
pricing scheme, Chunghua Telecom cannot retain the revenues of the outgoing mobile communications
originated from its fixed-line network but is mandated to collect the charges on behalf of the mobile firms.
Chunghua Telecom is then paid access charges by the mobile firms for transmitting calls to their mobile
networks.
Since the establishment of the asymmetric revenue-sharing scheme between mobile and fixed-line
communications, the mobile market has grown very quickly, while local telephony has experienced stagnant
growth (see Fig. 2). Indeed, the growth of both types of communications is interdependent, as they entail
substantial effects of substitution for each other (Kelly, 1996, p. 11).6 Table 2 delineates four calling patterns
between fixed-line and mobile communications. Chunghua Telecom can only set the tariff of the calling
pattern A (fixed-line-to-fixed-line communications), while the pricing authority of the other three goes to
mobile firms. Chunghua Telecom under this asymmetric revenue-sharing scheme retains only the revenues of
Pattern A. Unlike in most countries, where Pattern B’s (mobile-to-fixed-line communications) tariff is set
higher than C’s (fixed-line-to-mobile communications) due to a concern with universal service, those tariffs in
Taiwan are indifferent. Because mobile firms collect the revenues of both Patterns B and C, they have no
incentive to differentiate the tariffs.
Supposing a consumer’s choice of mobile telephony is a function of the price and the quantity of outgoing
and incoming calls (Shih, 2000),7 a higher tariff of Pattern C assuredly reduces the calling volume from the
fixed-line network to mobile systems while multiplying the calls made from mobile networks. By setting a
lower tariff for Pattern D (mobile-to-mobile communications) than C, mobile carriers further encourage the
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Fig. 2. Mobile and fixed-line communications in Taiwan. Data source: DGT statistics (http://www.dgt.gov.tw).
6Mobile substitution takes place at the level of (1) marginal choice over a second fixed-line telephone and (2) replacement of fixed-line
telephony (i.e., the first telephone) (Kelly, 1996, p. 11).
7Jun-ji Shih considers the utility of a consumer using the mobile service to be
U ¼ Uðq;x; yÞ (1)
where q is the number of outgoing calls, x is the number of incoming calls, and y is the quantity of all other goods consumed.
The consumer’s income constraint is
Y ¼ sqþ rxþ yþH (2)
Y is the total income, s is the tariff per outgoing call, r is the tariff per incoming call, and H is the installation fee for the telephone (Shih,
2000, pp. 8–10).
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fixed-line users to migrate to mobile-to-mobile communications. Currently, the number of mobile subscribers
has exceeded that of fixed-line telephony by ten million (DGT, 2003). When telephone users migrate from the
calling pattern C to D, Chunghua Telecom hardly obtains any access charges from mobile service providers
and its expected revenues are seriously truncated. Accordingly, this asymmetric tariff scheme enables mobile
firms to sign up customers more quickly and allows mobile-to-mobile service to prevail. While mobile service
providers have enjoyed extraordinarily high profits over the last 5 years, Chunghua Telecom is experiencing a
decline in calls and traffic volume of local voice telephony.
3. Empirical study of dualistic asymmetric regulation
Regression tests are used to measure the impacts of the dualistic asymmetric regulation on mobile
communications development, indicated by the mobile penetration rate and its growth. The fixed effects model
runs an ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation on the two dummy policy variables—the asymmetric
constraints on the dominant carrier (caps) and on the fixed-line carrier (payTai)—and their interaction term,
asyTai, a product of multiplying caps and payTai. The data, the model, the variables, and the discussion of the
control variables are included in the appendix.
Table 3 presents the regression results on the mobile penetration rate, and Table 4 reports the results on the
growth rate.8 Column A in Table 3 validates the effectiveness of dualistic asymmetric regulation on a country’s
mobile penetration level. Neither the restraint on the incumbent nor that on the fixed-line operator can
by itself generate significant impact; whereas their interaction term raises the penetration rate per capita
by 22 percent. Likewise, Column C of Table 3 shows that the interaction term produces a 21 percent increase
in the competitors’ subscription level per capita. However, neither dual regulatory asymmetries nor
their interaction term significantly causes the incumbent’s subscription level per head to plummet (see Column
B in Table 3). That is, simultaneous introduction of both asymmetric restraints is confirmed to develop a
country’s mobile communications, and seemingly, it does not accomplish this at the expense of its incumbent’s
advances.
The results in Table 4 then reveal the other part of the story. Although the dominant-carrier restraint and
the implementation of the twofold asymmetric regulation do not affect the incumbent’s mobile penetration
level, they do have significant and negative impacts on its growth pattern (see Column A of Table 4). Once
initiated, the dominant-carrier restraint decreases the incumbent’s mobile growth rate by 80 percent. Adding
the revenue-sharing constraint results in an additional 76 percent decrease in the incumbent’s mobile growth
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Table 2
Calling patterns from fixed-line to mobile communications
Calling to From
Fixed-line network Mobile network
Fixed-line network A (NT $0.34/min) B (NT $5.00/min)
Mobile network C (NT $5.60/min) D (NT $4.8/min)
Source: /http://www.dgt.gov.twS.
1. When making a call terminated by the local exchange carrier, the caller will adopt either the calling pattern A or B, depending on
availability of access to the local exchange network.
2. When making a call terminated by mobile service providers, the caller will definitely choose Pattern D as long as he/she has mobile
access.
3. It is imperative to notice that Pattern A will not be replaced by B, because the former’s tariff is much cheaper than the latter’s.
4. However, the calling pattern D is more likely to replace C if the latter’s tariff is more expensive than the former’s.
8The two proxy variables for the asymmetric regulation on the incumbent, caps and xcaps, produced similar and consistent findings,
although the dummy one gave a slightly larger impact. This paper thus presented the regression results generated by the dummy variable
caps.
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rate.9 In contrast, Column B in Table 4 demonstrates a much stronger impact on the development of the
competitors’ mobile voice services. Simultaneous introduction of both asymmetric regulations increases the
competitors’ growth rate by 13.29 times.
The regression results combined lead the authors to conclude that the implementation of the dualistic asymmetric
regulation will foster rapid development in mobile communications in a short period of time. The econometric
analysis allows recommendation of a policy solution for countries with underdeveloped telecommunications. They
are advised to simultaneously implement twofold asymmetric regulation in hopes of rapidly expanding mobile
voice services in a short time. The question, which remains, is whether or not implementation of such dualistic
asymmetric regulation is justified based on the outcome of rapid penetration in mobile communications. The
econometric findings in Table 4 affirm that, while competitors gain from twofold asymmetric regulation and boost
their subscription level, the incumbent’s ability to grow its customer base is devastated by the same regulatory
framework. That is, the swift expansion of mobile communications is made possible at the expense of the
incumbent’s growth. The next section explores the drawbacks which asymmetric regulation entails.
4. Seeking regulatory rents
In the last decade, the contractarian approach has made itself a presence in policy analysis in response to the
call for regulatory devolution and renovation. It views industrial regulation as a contract between the
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Table 3
Regulatory impact on the mobile penetration rate
Variables Mobile subscription per capita
(mobrate)
Penetration rate of the
incumbent (incumbs)
Penetration rate of the
competitors (compets)
[A] [B] [C]
Intercept 0.72 0.32 0.15
(0.10) (0.06) (0.08)
Market Openness 0.04 0.01 0.05
(firms) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Dominant-carrier restraint 0.02 0.02 0.04
(caps) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Revenue-sharing constraint Dropped Dropped Dropped
(payTai)
Interaction effect 1 0.22 0.01 0.21
(asyTai) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05)
Mobile-party pays principal Dropped Dropped Dropped
(payMob)
Interaction effect 2 0.06 0.01 0.04
(asyMob) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
GDP per capita 1.13e05 4.52e06 5.73e06
(gdppc) (3.12e06) (1.68306) (2.20e06)
Fixed-line per capita 2.06 1.01 0.48
(fixrate) (0.33) (0.19) (0.25)
Observations 136 116 116
F statistic 67.04 31.85 53.65
R2 within 0.7688 0.6498 0.7576
Data source: ITU Telecommunication Indicators (2003); DGT statistics /http://www.dgt.gov.twS.
Significant at the 5% level.
Significant at the 1% level.
Significant at the 0.1% level or less.
9It is imperative to notice that, as shown by Column A in Table 4, a country concurrently promulgating the dominant carrier restraint
and the mobile-party-pays tariff scheme will have the growth rate of its mobile incumbent decreased by 83 percent, compared with the
country adopting the caller-pays principle. In this sense, the caller-pays principle is a more favorable revenue-sharing regime for the
incumbent than the mobile-party-pays one.
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regulator and the regulated firm. Both parties ex ante specify the substantive terms and conditions of
regulation and ex post implement and enforce the regulation (Moe, 1984). Indeed, each telecommunications
operator has a unique incentive intensity concerning service provision. If the incentive scheme with which a
policy alternative is associated corresponds to its incentive intensity, its opportunity costs are greatly reduced
and its expected payoffs increase (Chou, 1999). Otherwise, the policy alternative will distort the firm’s
incentive to undertake telecommunications. As evidenced by the present econometric analysis, the twofold
asymmetric regulation in Taiwan increases the expected payoffs of mobile entrants by granting them the right
to charge and collect tariffs of fixed-line-to-mobile communications, and as a result, they are more likely to
make a telecommunications investment. Since the promulgation of the regulation, mobile competitors have
signed up 2.32 times more subscribers than Chunghua Telecom (DGT, 2003). Chunghua Telecom so far has
lost nearly 70 percent of the mobile market to the entrants.
From the contractarian point of view, regulatory asymmetry enables mobile entrants in Taiwan to reduce
business risks and take advantage of the unequal terms of competition to behave opportunistically, since the
incumbent is obligated to disclose all cost information and to provide full network access. The asymmetric
revenue-sharing constraint even acts like wealth transfer from Chunghua Telecom to the competitors. The
mobile competitors are thus greatly better off under asymmetric regulatory governance and they have strong
incentives to preserve this governance.
Policy scholars have long observed that interest group politics play an influential role in policy formation
and implementation. Since policies inevitably allocate costs and benefits among regulated firms, firms as
interest groups will make efforts to direct the policy agenda toward their own benefits. The winners in the
current regulatory regime desire to sustain influence over policymaking and deter policy changes that do not
reward them. On the contrary, losers tend to expand the scope of conflict. By mobilizing countervailing forces,
these firms struggle to redefine policy images and change policy agendas (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
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Table 4
Regulatory impact on the growth rate of mobile communications
Variables Growth rate of the incumbent’s mobile
subscription
Growth rate of the competitors’ mobile
subscription
(inshare) (comshare)
[A] [B]
Intercept 18.56** 61.31**
(5.07) (11.51)
Market Openness 0.02 0.38**
(firms) (0.06) (0.11)
Dominant-carrier restraint 1.61** 0.95
(caps) (0.33) (0.85)
Revenue-sharing constraint Dropped Dropped
(payTai)
Interaction effect 1 1.42* 2.66*
(asyTai) (0.57) (1.26)
Mobile-party-pays principal Dropped Dropped
(payMob)
Interaction effect 2 1.80** 1.76
(asyMob) (0.43) (1.09)
% changes in GDP per capita 1.95** 6.25**
(gdpln) (0.44) (1.53)
% changes in Fixed-line per capita 6.58** 3.52
(fixln) (1.19) (2.39)
Observations 112 47
F statistic 106.92 11.08
R2 within 0.8663 0.6616
Data source: ITU Telecommunication Indicators (2003); DGT statistics /http://www.dgt.gov.twS.*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 0.1% level or less.
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Accordingly, the telecommunications firm has an incentive to invest in non-economic activities, such as
lobbying or public affairs, in exchange for regulation in their favor.
However, such non-economic activities do not necessarily lead to socially desirable outcomes even if they
benefit individual firms (Mbaku, 1998). Particularly when the benefited firms successfully lobby against the
deployment of new services or technologies, the regulatory benefits they receive evolve into rents, that is,
abnormal profits. Economic output will decrease when the firms allocate resources towards rent seeking rather
than production and innovation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998. Sidak and Spulber argue against regulations that
encourage entry by subsidizing entrants or applying rules asymmetrically on incumbents because they may
create the potential for uneconomic bypass. The entry would be uneconomic without subsidies or asymmetric
regulation (Sidak & Spulber, 1998). This dualistic asymmetric regulation places Taiwanese mobile entrants in
an advantageous position to compete with Chunghua Telecom and, as is evidenced by the present econometric
analysis, entails regulatory benefits for them. They undoubtedly will engage in lobbies to preserve the benefits.
The case of the follow-me call service (the 099 service) is then examined to illustrate how mobile entrants
lobbied against a new service whose pricing scheme contradicts the dualistic asymmetric regulation.
The 099 call service offered by Chunghua Telecom since 1999 allows consumers to be fully connected with
only one number.10 Consumers’ utilities are indeed increased through its full access. When the 099 number is
set on the consumer’s mobile phone, the traffic is terminated at the mobile system and the mobile service
provider must grant Chunghua Telecom interconnection with its system. Chunghua Telecom’s original rate
for the 099 call service was $NT3.60 per minute and the company contributed an NT$2.00 access charge to the
mobile firm for traffic termination.
From the viewpoint of the rival mobile competitors, the allocation of the revenues of the 099 call service and
access charges nonetheless infringes on their right to retain the revenues from all mobile communications. The
mobile firm earns a net profit of about NT$5.00 per minute for the mobile service terminated over its network,
while obtaining only an NT$2.00 access charge for the 099 call service. In addition, the 099 call service shares
certain characteristics of a mobile service and yet costs less than mobile telephony, so that mobile subscribers
are easily lured to the service. Mobile competitors were set to lose profits if the 099 call service became more
popular. Therefore, mobile rivals lobbied the DGT to raise the tariff and the access charge on the 099 call
service. The mandated high tariffs of the 099 call service then led to a huge decline in subscription immediately
after its debut. This case demonstrates that regulated firms will invest in non-economic activities to deter
service renovation that conflicts with their interests and to withhold their privileges induced by the status quo
policy regime.
5. Conclusion: paradoxical impact on telecommunications development
This paper has examined the paradoxical impact which dualistic asymmetric regulation in Taiwan has had
on telecommunications development. Econometric analysis permits recommendation of a policy solution for
countries with underdeveloped telecommunications. Simultaneously implementing twofold asymmetric
regulation will bring about rapid penetration in mobile communications. It is notable, however, that this
prompt development of mobile communications is achieved at the expense of the incumbent’s growth.
Designated as a competition safeguard, asymmetric regulation entails policy benefits for mobile entrants,
enabling them to gain a higher penetration rate and abnormal profits. These beneficiaries, through lobbying,
then forestalled the 099 call service since its pricing scheme infringed on the asymmetric revenue-sharing
constraint. The regulatory gains then evolved into rents when the benefited firms lobbied against a renovated
value-added service.
Dualistic asymmetric regulation even creates disincentives for telecommunications firms to deploy fixed-line
technologies and services, since the local exchange carrier is prohibited from setting and collecting tariffs
for its outgoing traffic. As the fixed-line network involves specific assets, the firm is more likely to
forego providing service if it is deprived of the opportunity to earn a fair return on this irreversible investment.
The regulation therefore impedes competition in local telephony. In the long run, it may hinder
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10The 099 call service operates via setting up the 099 number either on the consumer’s home phone, office phone, or mobile phone. In
such a case, the consumer can be reached anywhere.
Y. Chou, K.-C. Liu / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 171–182 179
telecommunications development since it distorts companies’ incentives to invest in local exchange service and
directs their efforts to rent-seeking activities.
Policymakers must be alert about rent-seeking behaviors by rival competitors when promulgating twofold
asymmetric regulation in hopes of rapid growth in communications services. The present empirical analysis
implies that there should be a sunset point for the regulation, such that it no longer applies once a certain point
in market development (defined, for example, in terms of penetration rate) has been reached. It is suggested
that policymakers insert such sunset clauses in dualistic asymmetric regulation in order to fully utilize its
merits while avoiding rent-seeking activities by beneficiaries. However, the asymmetric revenue-sharing
constraint should not be repealed until after the mobile market has consolidated. Telecommunications officials
must also refrain from arbitrary discretion when promulgating regulations on the dominant carrier in the
competitive market. By so doing, regulators could create policy credibility and mitigate business risks for the
companies, thus creating an even playing field upon which companies are equally affected by regulations
and can thus focus on providing service and developing telecommunications in a way which maximizes
public benefit.
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Appendix A. Econometric analysis
Regression analyses were performed on the panel data designated by country and by year (1981–2002).
Eight OECD countries with different mobile pricing schemes—Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, France,
Germany, Portugal, Britain and the US—are selected as the benchmark of regulatory governance. Among
those countries, Portugal has a tariff regime similar to Taiwan’s, in which the fixed-line operators retain only
interconnection charges for their outbound traffic terminated at the mobile network. In contrast, France,
Germany, and the UK set up the ‘‘caller pays’’ tariff scheme, in which outgoing traffic is charged by its
originator and mobile firms retain only the revenues of their own outgoing calls. Japan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and the US on the other hand have adopted the ‘‘both-ends-pay’’ (or ‘‘mobile party pays’’)
principle, in which mobile phone users pay for both outgoing and incoming calls but mobile firms are not
authorized to set the tariff for fixed-line-to-mobile communications and do not own such revenues. A dummy
variable payTai records whether or not a country implements the asymmetric regulation on the fixed-line
operators. Another dummy variable payMob was created to further differentiate the impacts generated by the
mobile-party-pays principal from those of the calling-party-pays one. Ideally, it could more accurately
measure the impacts of each tariff regime by weighting the two dummy variables with a continuous one that
records the interconnection charge or the percentage of the communications revenues attributed to either
operator. However regrettably, such data are not made available publicly.
As far as the asymmetric restraints on the incumbent are concerned, in 1993, the OFTEL of Hong Kong
issued a price cap regulation on the dominant carrier, Hong Kong Telecom, until 2002. Japan did not impose
restrictions on the incumbent, NTT, until 1998, although mobile services were provided early in 1981.
Singapore has not yet considered asymmetric regulation since it opened its telecommunications market in
1996. France initiated asymmetric restrictions on the dominant carrier in 1995 but ended them in 1998, and
Germany began asymmetric regulation in 1993. Portugal followed the WTO basic telecommunications service
agreement to adopt the dominant carrier restriction in 1998. The United Kingdom adopted the asymmetric
regulation approach on BT since its privatization in 1984. The US promulgated price cap regulation against
the Baby Bells and AT&T in 1989 and repealed it by the enactment of the Telecommunications Act in 1996.
The dummy variable caps was created to reflect the presence (1) or absence (0) of such asymmetric regulation
in a given country. As the key component of this regulatory asymmetry mostly lies in price cap regulation, a
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variable xcaps was also created by multiplying the variable caps with the value of the price ceiling (known as
the x-indicator) to precisely capture the effects of price caps.
The mobile penetration growth rates are assumed to be, respectively, a linear function of the regulatory
variables and of the economic and demographic control variables. Three control variables are included in the
regressions to account for non-policy variation in the penetration rate: the degree of market competition
(firms), the level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (gdppc) and the number of fixed lines per capita
(fixrate). As for the regressions against the mobile growth rate, the latter two control variables are also
replaced by their growth rates: percentage changes in GDP per capita (growth) and percentage changes in the
fixed-line subscription per capita (fixln). The value of firms records the number of the firms offering mobile
voice services in a given market. By controlling firms, the effects caused by dualistic asymmetric regulation are
separated from those caused by competition policy.
The fixed-effects model runs an OLS estimation while controlling for country-specific information.
Country-specific information is accounted for by assuming that there is a time-invariant country-specific
component to the error term. Because that component does not vary over time, an algebraic manipulation can
be performed in order to create an estimating equation without the country-specific term that allows ordinary
least-squares estimation (Chou & Brock, 1998, pp. 4)
The regressions generate positive and significant coefficient estimates for the control variable firms. When
mobile communications is allowed for competition, the total penetration rate will increase by 4 percent as one
more entrant starts to offer the service (see Table 3). The competitors benefit by a 5 percent increase in their
current penetration level (or equivalently a 46 percent increase in their growth rate (as shown by Table 4)) with
one more company joining the battle. Competition policy unexpectedly raises the incumbent’s subscription
rate, too. Rather than being devastated by market competition, the incumbent earns a 1-percent increase in its
subscription base concurrently with the presence of one more rival. Market competition in this sense is a
win–win strategy under which both entrants and the incumbent will be better off.
The regression results also corroborate conventional wisdom that the growth of GDP per capita is, despite
its smaller-scale influence, significantly correlated with mobile development. In Table 3, a one US dollar
increase in GDP per capita causes an increase in the total mobile penetration rate of about 0.01 percent, and in
both the incumbent’s and the competitors’ of less than 0.01 percent. Table 4 shows that a one-percent increase
in GDP per capita generates a 1.95 percent increase in the incumbent’s subscription number but a greater 6.25
percent decrease in the competitors’. This result clearly implies that a country with a lower growth rate of
GDP per capita (i.e., a more developed economy) represents a more benevolent environment for the
competitors to expand.
As far as the substitution effects between fixed-line and mobile communications are concerned, the
regression findings fail to support the presumed negative correlation. As shown by Table 3, a unit increase in
the number of fixed lines per capita will raise the total mobile penetration level by 2.06 units and the
incumbent’s mobile subscription per head by 1.01 units. Table 4 reveals that a 1-percent increase in the fixed
lines per capita results in a 6.58-percent increase in the incumbent’s mobile subscription per head.
Nevertheless, it does not generate significant impact on mobile entrants’ subscription per capita. Because of
the speed of entrants’ subscription growth, it may constitute a non-linear relationship with the penetration rate
of fixed lines, and the coefficient estimate is insignificant by the OLS estimation.
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